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Book Review
The Acontextual Illusion of a
Color-Blind Constitution
The Color-Blind Constitution
By Andrew Kull*
Harvard University Press 1992. Pp. 301. $35
Reviewed by

BRYAN

I.

Background: The Colorblindness Dilemma in the
Twenty-First Century

A.

The Significance of Race in the United States

K.

FAIR**

Suppose there were a national referendum in which you were asked to
honor the following pledge:
I shall never tolerate in my life or in the life or practices of my government the differential treatment of other human beings by race. I shall
never favor any person or treat anyone less well than another for being
Black, White, Brown or Red.'
Would you agree to live by such a pledge? How would it change the way
you live? Another way to ask the same questions is to ask, are you colorblind? Or, does race influence how you vote, where you live, who you date
or wed, the schools you or your children attend, the church or social clubs
with which you affiliate, or your employment opportunities?
Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law; B.A., Duke
University, 1982; J.D., U.C.L.A. School of Law, 1985.
1. I borrow the language for this pledge from William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:
Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 809-10 (1979).
I have consistently employed the upper case when using the labels "Black" and "White." I
believe that racial equality requires that we use proper nouns to designate all racial groups. Also,
the term Black is frequently used interchangeably with the terms African-American and Negro,
and the term White is frequently used in place of the terms Caucasian and Anglo-European. Finally, the labels seem to have significant meaning beyond chromatic colors.
*

**
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I know I am not color-blind. I think colorblindness is antithetical to
our achievement of racial equality. Indeed, I agree with Professor Cornel
West that Race Matters.2 I have known personally the extreme poverty and
self-shame about which Professor West has so eloquently written. My cumulative life experience has occurred between Black and White communities. I have lived in segregated housing and attended segregated schools. I
too have been left standing in the street by empty taxis, refused accommodations in motels with vacancies and turned away from dance clubs because
it was not "my" night. I have learned through lived experiences that people
are not color-blind.
Most of my experiences with color awareness relate
to private conduct
or custom which is too frequently beyond the reach of law. Indeed, our
national race jurisprudence has embraced as real the distinction between
public and private racial discrimination. 3 I think such a distinction is artificial. State action is arguably present whenever the state approves or fails to
prohibit race-based acts or decisions by individuals that promote the
subordinate status of others, or that place others in a position of a caste. As
Professor Kenneth Karst has suggested, Blacks, or for that matter any other
racial group, have the right to be treated by organized society as participating members who belong to the national community. 4 It seems illogical
that we can see and act by race in the morning and then turn a blind eye to
race in the afternoon.
Yet, even if I accept the public/private paradigm that has been part of
our constitutional law since at least 1883,5 that only leads to several related
questions: Does the United States or your state have a constitutional tradition of colorblindness? Does the United States Constitution prohibit all racial classifications by government agencies, or just unreasonable racial
classifications? Does the Constitution prohibit government agencies from
taking affirmative steps to eliminate racial caste in the United States?
These latter questions, which have faced this Nation since its inception, are

2. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATrERS (1993). Professor West correctly identifies Black poverty and self-hate as the essential targets of public policies if this nation is to halt the continuation
of racial caste. Id. at 63-67.
3. Compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) with Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
4. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. Rav. 245, 247-48 (1983). See also
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQuAL CIIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1989).
5. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883) (holding that several provisions of the
1875 Civil Rights Act were unconstitutional because they were directed at private individuals not
the state).
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the subject of Andrew Kull's important and fascinating new book, The
6
Color-Blind Constitution.
The book is important because it is the first to extensively examine the
doctrine of colorblindness as a rhetorical theme in legal advocacy. Several
notable law review articles have addressed the topic, including works by
Neil Gotanda, 7 David Strauss, 8 Laurence Tribe, 9 William Van Alstyne,10
Paul Brest," John Hart Ely 12 and John Kaplan.1 3 The book is fascinating
because Professor Kull focuses the reader on the substantial irony in interpreting Fourteenth Amendment equality jurisprudence to prohibit remedial
action on behalf of Blacks; yet he fails to resolve the irony or to explain
why no solution is necessary. In other words, the colorblindness paradox
remains.
The Color-Blind Constitution is also rich in historical detail and rigorous analysis of race law, and would therefore complement any examination
of race and the Constitution. Professor Kull's most valuable contribution is
his construction of the legal genealogy of colorblindness as a theme in the
writing of some abolitionists, lawyers and state judges as early as the 1830s.
Prior to his book, most writers began their analysis of the colorblindness
doctrine with Justice John Marshall Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v.
14
Ferguson.
Kull presents the book as a story in legal history rather than one about
the contemporary affirmative action debate. Actually, Kull tells the legal
history as a prelude to his views regarding the affirmative action debate.
His critique is that colorblindness was a rhetorical theme articulated by civil
rights activists for over 120 years until the late 1960s when they did an
6.
7.

ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CoNsTrITON (1992).
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 1-3

(1991) (examining the ideological content of the phrase "Our constitution is color-blind").
8. David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness,1986 Sup. CT. Rv. 99, 100-13 (discussing the doctrinal consistency between affirmative action and antidiscrimination principles).
9. Laurence H. Tribe, In What Vision of the ConstitutionMust the Law Be Color-Blind?,20
J. MARsHALL L. Rav. 201, 203 (1986) (discussing Justice Harlan's view that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited government laws enshrining White supremacy).
10. Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 809 (arguing in support of colorblindness).
11. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,90 HARV. L. REv.
1, 1-2, 16-23 (1976) (arguing against the colorblindness standard).
12. John H. Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REv.
723 (1974) (arguing against the use of a strict colorblindness model when a political or racial
majority discriminates against itself).

13. John Kaplan, Equal Justicein an Unequal World: Equalityfor the Negro-The Problem
of Special Treatment,61 Nw. U. L. Rav. 363 (1966) (arguing against the use of race as a basis for
special treatment for Blacks in the employment context).
14. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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15
about-face and began to promote "compensatory racial preferences"
designed to "prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the ef16
fects of past discrimination."
Kull conjoins the efforts of abolitionists from the nineteenth century
with efforts a century later by NAACP lawyers into a continuous civil
rights movement that espoused a philosophy of nondiscrimination. This
conjoining, I think, is generous to our history. Indeed, our history of civil
rights reform has been cyclical and episodic at best. 17 Nonetheless, Professor Kull tells an interesting story about the struggle to define racial equality
and, the meaning of nondiscrimination in the United States. I agree with
Kull that the issues raised in his book are likely to be a baseline for a significant portion of constitutional analysis and debate regarding the legitimacy
of racial classifications well into the next century.1 8

B.

The Supreme Court and the Modern Colorblindness Dilemma

The Supreme Court's decision last term in Shaw v. Reno19 evidences
that the questions raised by Professor Kull will occupy the Court for some
time to come. In Shaw, five Justices held that a North Carolina reapportionment/redistricting plan, designed to create a second majority Black district
out of the twelve districts in the state, was drawn "so extremely irregularly
on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the

15. KUILL, supra note 6, at viii.
16. KtLL, supra note 6, at 181 (quoting United States v. Jefferson County Bd.of Educ., 372
F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966)).
17. Sometimes referred to as the First and Second Reconstruction, the periods between
1865-1875 and 1957-1968, respectively, mark the zenith of civil rights reform. Between 1865 and
1875, Congress enacted the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the
Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1865, and the 1866, 1870, 1871 and 1875 Civil Rights Acts. Between

1957 and 1968, Congress enacted the 1957 and 1964 Civil Rights Acts, the 1965 Voting Rights
Act and the 1968 Fair Housing Act. Professor Kull writes precious little about these significant
amendments and statutes and how the need for such laws undermines the argument of a colorblind legal tradition.
18. I too have recently analyzed the problem of colorblindness. See Bryan K. Fair, Foreword: Rethinking the ColorblindnessModel, 13 NAT'L BLACKc L.J. 1 (1993). Professor Kull's
book was published as my article went to press. The theses of my article are that our legal history
reflects intense color awareness rather than colorblindness, jurists and commentators have taken
the colorblindness language of Justice Harlan out of context, and current expositions of the colorblindness principle are inconsistent with the meaning intended by Justice Harlan. While I will not
restate my earlier argument here, I do not embrace Professor Kull's views regarding colorblindness or affirmative action policy. This review attempts both a summary and critique of Kull's
principal arguments.
19. 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).
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races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting princi'20
ples and without sufficiently compelling justification.
The majority, relying on Gomillion v. Lighlfoot,21 concluded that persons objecting to such racial gerrymanders could challenge the schemes
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 Yet the
Court also acknowledged that it has never held "that race-conscious state
decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances. '2 3 Thus, as recently
as June 1993, the Court has reiterated that while governmental racial classi24
fications are disfavored, they are not per se invalid.
Four Justices dissented in Shaw, concluding that the majority had ignored controlling precedent wherein the Court had rejected a claimf that
creating a majority-minority district violated the Constitution. 25 The dissenters relied principally on the Court's 1977 decision in United Jewish
Organizations,Inc. v. Carey26 to argue that the notion that North Carolina's
plan, under which Whites remained a voting majority in a disproportionate
number of congressional districts, might have violated the appellants' constitutional rights, is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. 27 Professor Kull would probably agree with the result
reached in Shaw, but I am certain he would object to the Court's reasoning
because he advocates a constitutional ban on all racial classifications, including benign racial classifications favoring previously disfavored racial
28
minorities.
Although it is clear from the final pages of his book that Professor Kull
is sensitive to the persistence of racial caste in the United States and that he
appreciates the irony in adopting race-neutral principles to eradicate such
20. Id. at 2824. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.

21. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Gomillion, the Alabama Legislature redefined the boundaries of
the city of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" that excluded 99%
of the Black voters from the city limits. Id. at 340-41.
22. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2824.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2825-28.
25. Id. at 2834-49. Justices White, Stevens, Blackmun and Souter each filed dissenting
opinions.
26. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
27. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2834.
28. KuLL, supra note 6, at 220-23. Thus, I believe Professor Kull would object to the
Court's acceptance of the use of racial classifications in student and faculty assignments in public
schools. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In Swann, Chief
Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, explicitly rejected the contention that school authorities could not use racial classifications in assigning faculty to various schools. 402 U.S. at
19. See also Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 35 (1971).
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caste, 29 his book does not provide a way out of the colorblindness conundrum. 30 Kull's book would be far more significant if he had said directly
what is to be done about racial caste in the United States. And if his answer
is nothing, he should have said so explicitly and then explained why that is
fair. Thus, while I benefitted from Kull's fine research, I expected and
wanted more from the book.
I have tried to explain previously why I think constitutional colorblindness is unfair and should be rejected in constitutional theory. 31 I do not
believe we will attain racial equality until we interpret our Constitution as
proscribing racial caste and placing on government an affirmative duty to
eradicate it. Below, I shall not repeat my prior argument, but instead critique Kull's theses. I proceed by the order of his chapters, although the
headings are my own.
II. The Book Review
A.

Introduction-The Genealogy of Colorblindness Rhetoric

The purpose of Kull's book is "to locate the sources of the constitutional argument for radical nondiscrimination, 'colorblindness,' and to trace
its subsequent manifestations. '32 Kull has achieved his purpose better than
any previous writer. By way of his Introduction, Kull makes a number of
preliminary points. In the most significant of these, he finds the principal
themes of the colorblindness dilemma in the brief of Charles Sumner, attorney for the plaintiff, and in the opinion of Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw in
Roberts v. City of Boston33 almost fifty years before the U.S. Supreme
Court entertained the subject.34 Thus, well before Justice John Marshall
Harlan said, "Our constitution is color-blind, ' 35 lawyers and jurists had
29. KULL, supra note 6, at 222-23.
30.

The Shaw majority opinion illuminates the many methodological infirmities of the color-

blindness principle advocated by Professor Kull. Neither the Court nor Kull provides a constitutional formulation to eliminate racial caste. Nor do they significantly address the factual contexts
of segregation and racial discrimination by Whites against Blacks that provided the backdrop for
calls of nondiscrimination or colorblindness. Thus, in Shaw the majority writes virtually nothing

about grandfather clauses, all-White primaries, literacy tests, poll taxes or other schemes adopted
to prevent Blacks from voting. Even worse, the Court's principal reference to an example of
racial discrimination against Blacks, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), is now used to
prevent the state from drawing districting lines in a manner likely to result in the election of a
second Black congressional representative. The Court announces that Shaw and Gomillion are cut
from the same cloth in the same way that Kull announces that segregation against Blacks and
affirmative action "favoring" Blacks are the same, that is, unjust. Meanwhile, racial caste persists.
31. See Fair, supra note 18, at 64-73.
32. KULL, supra note 6, at 2.
33. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
34. KULL, supra note 6, at 2-5.
35. See infra notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
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36
given voice to arguments for and against the use of racial classifications.
Professor Kull writes, "The Supreme Court today exercises an unconstrained discretion in determining the permissible and impermissible uses of
race."'37 Kull is right that this authority is the legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson,38 yet he fails to acknowledge that it has been national orthodoxy since
39
the middle of the seventeenth century.

B.

Chapter One-Color Awareness and the Constitution

Professor Kull correctly states that "[a] constitution that admitted Negro slavery did not make a promising charter of nondiscrimination .... "40
But Kull further points out how in 1778, in the course of the debate over
proposed amendments to the Articles of Confederation, delegates to the
Continental Congress defeated a proposal to add the term "White" to the
Comity Clause of Article IV. 4 1 Professor Kull further contends that the
language in Article IV supports a restriction on the freedom of states to
distinguish between citizens on the basis of race. 42 Yet, he acknowledges it
would be an overstatement to conclude that the Comity Clause defeat shows
a "majoritarian" devotion to interracial equality.4 3 Indeed, other provisions
of the Constitution clearly were drafted as compromises to slavery. 44
36. KULL, supra note 6, at 2-5.
37. KULL, supra note 6, at 5.
38. KULL, supra note 6, at 5-6.
39. Our racial traditions in this country began well before 1787 or 1850. Indeed, the first 20
Black indentured servants were sold at Jamestown in August of 1619. By 1660 perpetual slavery
for Blacks was institutionalized. And for over 100 years before our Constitution was adopted,
Black slavery was commonplace and flourishing. See Fair, supra note 18, at 11-31.
40. KULL, supra note 6, at 7. I do not think the Constitution was a glorious liberty document, and it clearly was not interpreted as such with respect to Blacks, slave or free, or women.
KuLL, supra note 6, at 7-9.
41. KULL, supra note 6, at 9. Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution provides: "The
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States."
42. KULL, supra note 6, at 9.
43.

KULL, supra note 6, at 9.

44. The historian William Wiecek compiled the following list of direct and indirect accommodations to slavery contained in the Constitution:
1. Article I, Section 2: representatives in the House were apportioned among the
states on the basis of population, computed by counting all free persons and three-fifths
of the slaves (the "federal number," or "three-fifths," clause);
2. Article I, Section 2 and Article I, Section 9: two clauses requiring, redundantly, that direct taxes (including capitations) be apportioned among the states on the
foregoing basis, the purpose being to prevent Congress from laying a head tax on slaves
to encourage their emancipation;
3. Article I, Section 9: Congress was prohibited from abolishing the international
slave trade to the United States before 1808;
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I Here, and throughout his book, Kull tries to prove too much by refer-

ence to an isolated example of apparent racial sensitivity. Given the numerous indirect references to Black slavery in the text of the Constitution, 45 it is
surprising that a legal historian of Kull's stature would deny or minimize its
pro-slavery origins. The Constitution was a "glorious liberty document"
only for some of our citizens, and only after significant further amendment
did it become a jurisprudential benchmark for much of the rest of the
world.46
The Color-Blind Constitution illustrates how difficult it is to reconstruct historical records and interpret them in context and without omission.
Kull scrutinizes congressional records relating to the adoption and amendment of the Constitution, as well as state statutory provisions restricting the
civil rights, ofBlacks.4 7 He reminds his readers that our first national charter left race matters and civil rights significantly to state fiat, and many
states acted affirmatively to restrict the civil rights of Blacks with increasingly repressive laws. 48 One very visible form of such laws was the Negro
Seaman Act, "providing that free black sailors aboard out-of-state or foreign vessels . ..should be seized and imprisoned until their ships were
ready to depart." 49 Such laws were in no sense color-blind and they did not
violate the Constitution.
Kull also reminds the reader of the various state responses to defining
citizenship. In that context, no case has had more significance than Dred
4. Article IV, Section 2: the states were prohibited from emancipating fugitive
slaves, who were to be returned on demand of the master;
5. Article I, Section 8: Congress was empowered to provide for calling up the
states' militias to suppress insurrections, including slave uprisings;
6. Article IV, Section 4: the federal government was obliged to protect the states
against domestic violence, including slave insurrections;
7: Article V: the provisions of Article I, Section 9, clauses 1 and 4 (pertaining to
the slave trade and direct taxes) were made unamendable; [and]
8. Article I, Section 9, and Article I, Section 10: these two clauses prohibited the
federal government and the states from taxing exports, one purpose being to prevent
them from taxing slavery indirectly by taxing the exported product of slave labor.
DERRICK BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 34-35
(1987). See also DERRICK A. BELL,JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 26-30 (3d ed. 1992).
45.

See supra note 44 for a discussion of indirect references to Black slavery in the

Constitution.
46. The late Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall made this point more concisely in
Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1,2 (1987).
He wrote that "[w]en contemporary Americans cite 'The Constitution,' they invoke a concept
that is vastly different from what the framers barely began to construct two centuries ago."

47. KuLL, supra note 6, at 11.
48. KULL, supra note 6, at 11.
49. KULL, supra note 6, at 11.
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Scott.50 Although Kull does not say it explicitly, he cannot deny that the

Dred Scott decision clearly demonstrated that the Court's interpretation of
the meaning of citizenship was not color-blind. Whites had rights and priv51
ileges simply not enjoyed by Blacks, whether slave or free.
Was the United States Constitution color-blind at the outset? Professor Kull says, yes. 52 But, in his view, it made little difference because the
Constitution imposed only marginal limitations on the freedom of the states,
North and South, to treat their citizens differently on the basis of race simply because the federal compact did not restrict the authority of the states in
those areas of the law where racial discrimination was imposed or tolerated. 53 Kull all but admits that our Constitution provided virtually no protection to Blacks, slave or free, from state-sanctioned discrimination. This
admission severely weakens his contention of a color-blind Constitution.
Professor Kull's statement at the end of the first chapter, "The Constitution was color-blind from the outset" is perplexing. 54 He argues that the
text of the Constitution did not use racial classifications or race labels, such
as Black or White. But that is really beside the point. What matters is that
since well before 1787, one's racial classification in the United States has
55
had significant influence on one's status and rights in the community.
Thus, our national tradition has been one of color awareness, not
colorblindness.
C.

Chapter Two-The Rejection of Colorblindness Before the Civil
War

Professor Kull asserts that suffragists, abolitionists and radical Republicans who challenged Black laws as early as the 1830s advocated a policy
of colorblindness. 5 6 Kull, however, does not appear to interpret such challenges contextually. For example, Ohio's "Black laws" denied the vote,
hindered immigration, prohibited testifying in court and excluded Black
50. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-04 (1857) (holding persons of African
descent were not intended to be included under the term "citizens". in the Constitution). See also
KULL, supra note 6, at 15-20.

51. I think Dred Scott is the most important race case ever decided because it, more than any
other, expresses the extreme national, racial antipathy toward Blacks in this country and their
official outsider status. I have discussed Dred Scott more fully elsewhere. See Fair, supra note
18, at 22-25.
52. KULL, supra note 6, at 20-21. I strongly disagree with Kull on this point and I have
explained more fully elsewhere that I do not think our Constitution has been interpreted through a
color-blind lens. See Fair, supra note 18, at 64-73.
53. KULL, supra note 6, at 20.
54. KULL, supra note 6, at 20.
55. Fair, supra note 18, at 11-31.
56. KULL, supra note 6, at 22-39.
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children from public schools. 57 The arguments of abolitionists against such
"Black laws" were made in a world infected with racial subordination of
Blacks. If the Ohio laws were representative of those passed by other
states, it seems improbable that many, if any, states have had a tradition of
constitutional colorblindness.58
Kull does not prove then, that abolitionists or suffragists intended the
term "colorblindness" as he uses it, i.e., as a strict rule banning racial classifications. Instead, he proves that a policy of constitutional colorblindness
was repeatedly rejected in the courts and legislative chambers throughout
the nation. In addition, calls for colorblindness, when placed in context,
were actually calls for an end to the racial hegemony of Whites over Blacks.
Kull's account, therefore, does not capture our history of racial domination.
Racial classifications have been the rule in the United States, not the
exception. Thus, in 1839, after its anti-slavery fair in Lynn, Massachusetts,
the Lynn Women's Anti-Slavery Society was vilified when it petitioned the
Massachusetts legislature for repeal of "'all laws in this State, which make
any distinction among its inhabitants, on account of color.'-59 The ban on
interracial marriages was the rule, and challenges to such rules led to public
ridicule or ostracism. 6° Moreover, while it is true that Charles Olcott provided a catalogue of the anti-slavery principles 6' (including views that "the
law should be equal for all," 62 "it should abjure racial distinctions," 6 3 and
"the only sure guarantee of 'equal laws'. . . is to prohibit racial classifications" 64) to suggest that such principles were embraced as the American
ideal is an overstatement. In fact, some abolitionists were unopposed to
legal restrictions on the civil rights of Blacks, even though they opposed
slavery. 65 Kull acknowledges, for instance, how delicate interracial mar57. KULL, supra note 6, at 24-25.
58. There is ample evidence that Ohio had numerous role models for its Black codes. For a
survey of such laws in Virginia, Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina, Georgia and Pennsylvania, see generally A. LEON HiGGnwBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATER OF COLOR (1978), and JOHN
H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDoM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS (3d ed. 1967).

59. KULL, supra note 6, at 22, 23-26 (citation omitted). The apparent source of the ridicule
was the fact that the primary Massachusetts law which contained a racial classification was the
ban on interracial marriages. Thus, one group of males petitioned the legislature to permit their
female counterparts "to marry ... any Negro, Indian, Hottentot, or any other being in human
shape, at their will and pleasure." KuLL, supra note 6, at 23.
60. KULL, supra note 6, at 23.
61. KULL, supra note 6, at 27-29.
62. KULL, supra note 6, at 28.
63.
64.

KULL, supra note 6, at 28.
KULL, supra note 6, at 28.

65. A full exposition of the dissension among abolitionists regarding the civil rights of
Blacks is beyond the scope of this review. However, one example of the division is the rift
between Frederick Douglass and William Lloyd Garrison regarding Douglass' very public rela-
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riage and school segregation issues were for abolitionists.6 He correctly
states that much of the contemporary argument against school desegregation dates at least to the 1840s. 67 Kull, however, does not demonstrate that
abolitionists or suffragists were color-blind.
D.

Chapter Three-The Prelude to Plessy v. Ferguson

Most analyses of the principle of colorblindness begin with a review of
Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, where he
penned the phrase "Our constitution is color-blind. '68 Professor Kull has
found the same nondiscrimination principle present in Roberts v. City of
Boston,69 the first judicial opinion on the lawfulness of segregation. 70 Roberts arose in Massachusetts after Sarah Roberts, a four-year-old Black child,
was refused admission to the primary school nearest her home solely on the
basis of her color.7 1 Kull does not confront the profound implications of
Roberts' exclusion. His failure to address issues of racial supremacy and
racial caste weakens his critique.
Professor Kull writes:
The ensuing debate over the lawfulness of segregation between Charles
Sumner, attorney for the plaintiff, and Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, author
of the opinion for the Supreme Judicial Court [of. Massachusetts], is
more closely reasoned and more eloquently expressed than anythifig that
lawyers and judges (Justice Harlan excepted) would again write on the
subject; and it would prove to have defined, for a century and more72thereafter, the constitutional arguments on either side of the question.
According to Kull, Sumner was concerned with racial discrimination per se
when he asked: "'Can any discrimination, on account of color or race, be
made, under the Constitution and Laws of Massachusetts, among the children entitled to the benefit of our public schools?" 73 Thus, in Roberts,
Sumner focused on the unlawfulness and unreasonableness of segregation
tionship with a White female friend. See WALD.o E. MARTIN, JR., THE MIND OF FREDERICK
DoutLAss 40-48 (1984). Even some of the most ardent supporters of abolishing slavery could not
envision a perfect equality between Blacks and Whites. See LAWRENCE LADER, THE BOLD
BRAHMINS: NEw ENGLAND'S WAR AGAINST SLAvERY: 1831-1863, at 45-47, 117-19 (1961). See
generally GARY B. NASH & JEAN R. SODE u.,uD, FREEDOM By DEGREES: EMANCIPATION IN
PENNSYLVANIA AND ITS AFTERMTH (1991).
66. KULL, supra note 6, at 23-24, 29-37.
67. KuLL, supra note 6, at 37-39.
dissenting).
68. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
69. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
70.

Ku_ ,supra note 6, at 40-41.

71.
72.
73.

KULL, supra note 6, at 40.
KULL, supra note 6,at 40.
KULL, supra note 6, at 41 (citations omitted).
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itself.74 Because a system of segregated schools was in the nature of caste,
it was unconstitutional, and compulsory segregation from the mass of citizens was itself an inequality according to Sumner. 75 Kull aptly demonstrates that many points articulated by later colorblindness advocates were
marshalled by Sumner in 1850.76
Kull finds in Chief Justice Shaw's opinion for a unanimous Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court the source of the "separate but equal" doctrine
subsequently articulated by Justice Henry Brown in Plessy.77 In addition,
Kull argues that the essential legitimacy of reasonable racial classifications
is traceable to Shaw's opinion in Roberts.78 Chief Justice Shaw rejected a
total ban on racial classifications, holding that governments must classify in
order to legislate and that classifications need only be reasonable. 79 Chief
Justice Shaw reasoned that because a school committee could teach children by age group or by sex, it could also provide for separate schools by
race.80 He rejected Sumner's implicit premise that "there is something
uniquely bad about racial classification and that this form of discrimination ... is inconsistent with American ideals."81

Professor Kull is correct that the Sumner-Shaw debate is substantially
the same as that between Justices Brown and Harlan in Plessy four-andone-half decades later. But he understates the significance of how resoundingly Chief Justice Shaw rejected colorblindness. Sarah Roberts lost. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts did not interpret the law as colorblind. Instead, Sarah's race could be used to exclude her from the local
school. In context, Roberts means racial classifications are permissible, so
long as they are reasonable. Therefore, Roberts is not a case establishing
colorblindness as precedent.
Moreover, it is a mistake for Kull to suggest that Charles Sumner
would have opposed racial classifications favoring former slaves. Indeed,
Sumner and his comrade Thaddeus Stevens supported affirmative action
82
legislation to give land confiscated during the Civil War to former slaves.
74. KULL, supra note 6, at 41-43.
75.

KULL, supra note 6, at 43, 45.

76. KULL, supra note 6, at 43-48.
77. KULL, supra note 6, at 48.
78.
79.
80.
81.

KULL, supra note 6, at 48.
KULL, supra note 6, at 50.
KULL, supra note 6, at 51.
KULL, supra note 6, at 51-52.

See MOORFIELD STOREY, CHARLES SUMNER (1972); DAVID DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER
AND THE RioTS OF MAN (1970). See also EDWARD B. CALLENDER, THADDEUS STEVENS: COM82.

MONER (AMS Press 1972); RALPH KORNOOLD, THADDEUS STEVENS: A BEING DARKLY WISE AND
RUDELY GREAT (1955). For specific references to Sumner's position on special treatment and
protection of freedmen, see DONALD, supra, at 119-20, 177, 180, 287, 298-99, and 301; for Ste-
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The "forty acres and a mule" legislation was ultimately rejected by Congress, but supported by both Sumner and Stevens.
Sumner knew a world where Whites used racial classifications to disfavor Blacks. His statements about colorblindness were presented in a case
in which a Black plaintiff alleged that a state policy promoted racial caste.
He believed racial caste violated the Massachusetts Constitution. Kull provides no proof that Sumner would have opposed programs to eliminate racial caste. Indeed, Kull merely proves that Sumner opposed school
83
segregation as a kind of racial caste.
Kull's discussion of Roberts is important because, although that decision preceded the adoption of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,8 4 it illustrates indisputably that in 1850 color awareness was
the rule, not the exception. It is also interesting because Kull does not examine why it was necessary to separate a Black child from a White child in
public schools. Despite Kull's superb skills as a historian, he demonstrates
little understanding of the social and political consequences of race and
racism in the United States. Nowhere does Kull acknowledge the doctrine
of racial supremacy that undergirds the decision to cast Black children as
unfit to associate with White children. Kull should know that the historical
reservation of the best educational opportunities for Whites only has contributed to the continuing caste conditions of Blacks. Since I do not think
racial caste is inevitable, I am still waiting for a new analysis of the colorblindness doctrine which explains how we can eliminate racial caste without considering race. 85
E.

Chapter Four-Radical Reconstruction and Racial
Classifications

Professor Kull locates his colorblindness tradition in the work of Wendell Phillips, the statesman and abolitionist who delivered speeches at Boston and New York in 1863 urging Congress to initiate measures for an
amendment that "Slavery shall henceforth have no place in any State within
this Union. ' '86 He urged a prohibition of slavery and a prohibition on state
laws that drew legal distinctions on racial lines. 87 Kull illustrates that Philvens' views, see KORNGOLD, supra, at 281-90. Stevens believed that "[florty acres should be
given to each adult male freedman, of whom there were about one million." KORNOLD, supra, at
282.
83. KULL, supra note 6, at 42-46.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Amendment provides in relevant part: "No State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
85. I have previously attempted such an analysis, see Fair, supra note 18, at 73-81.
86. KULL, supra note 6, at 55.
87. KuLL, supra note 6, at 55-56.
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lips repeatedly asserted the need for the elimination of the idea of race or
racial distinctions from American politics.8 8 Kull, however, gives less significance to the fact that Phillips thought the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments did not go far enough to protect former slaves. 89 Neither
amendment eliminated the caste status of Blacks. Kull quotes Phillips as
having said "'but it is our duty ... to say that no civil, no social, no political right shall in any instance, in any part of the nation, be dependent on
race; especially that the negro race shall not be excluded from any right on
account of their blood .. ."90
Phillips' statement contains both colorblindness and color awareness
rhetoric. The first part seems to be all that Kull says: unequivocally colorblind. But when the first clause is juxtaposed with the second, it is difficult
to argue that Phillips would have opposed legislation to secure equal rights
for Blacks. Indeed, Kull acknowledges briefly that Phillips endorsed the
need to extend military reconstruction which ostensibly was established to
protect former slaves from those who would wish to reestablish slavery or
some like institution. 9' The Freedmen's Bureau was also an early form of
affirmative action which had the support of a majority of Congress.
F.

Chapter Five-The Thirty-Ninth Congress and
Antidiscrimination Statutes

Kull provides a luminous analysis of the records of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress relating to the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. He writes:
The essential distinction between radical and moderate proposals for the
federal protection of civil rights lay between a rule of nondiscrimination
on the one hand and a guarantee of equality on the other .... Nondiscrimination was rejected in the successive contexts of Negro suffrage and
the basis of representation; the civil rights bill; the proposed "Bingham
Amendment"; and the Fourteenth Amendment itself. In each instance,,
Congress indicated that it preferred the more malleable notions of equal92
ity and "equal protection" to an unyielding rule of nondiscrimination.
88. KuLL, supra note 6, at 55-56.
89. KULL, supra note 6, at 58-64.
90. KULL, supra note 6, at 65 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
91. KULL, supra note 6, at 64. Pursuant to its new constitutional power, Congress enacted
the Freedmen Bureau Act of 1865, 13 Stat. 507 (1865). Section 2 provided: 'That the Secretary
of War may direct such issues of provisions, clothing, and fuel, as he may deem needful for the
immediate and temporary shelter and supply of destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen and
their wives and children, under such rules and regulations as he may direct." For subsequent
amendments, see 14 Stat. 173 (1866) and 15 Stat. 83 (1868).
92. KULL, supra note 6, at 69.
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Kull thinks that a rule of nondiscrimination is less malleable than a rule of
equality and he contends that Congress rejected as too "radical" a rule of
nondiscrimination because the open-ended equality standard meant less
than a rigid colorblindness standard. 93 Congress' preference "was to retain
94
the discretion to discriminate by race as appropriate.
I disagree with Kull that the terms "nondiscrimination" and "equality"
have different levels of malleability. Moreover, I am not persuaded by
Kull's argument that if nondiscrimination language had been adopted by
Congress, racial discrimination would have ended. Racial discrimination
has not ended because it has been extremely beneficial to some members of
this society. It is not inevitable, but rather the result of conscious choices.
The Supreme Court has at times thought itself incompetent to control
racial discrimination. Here I am reminded of the painful, yet time-honored
words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes writing for a majority of the Court
in Giles v. Harris,95 the Montgomery voting discrimination case in which,
under various provisions of the state constitution, virtually all White males
were permitted to vote, while virtually all Blacks were excluded from voting. Justice Holmes suggested that if "the great mass of the white population intends to keep the blacks from voting," 96 the Court was largely
powerless to grant meaningful relief. Such relief instead would necessarily
come from the state itself or the legislative and political departments of the
federal government. 97 The past twelve decades are a monument of resistance to full equality for Blacks. Professor Kull does not sufficiently capture
the pervasiveness of racial bias and racial subordination during the period
he asserts was part of a colorblindness tradition.
G.

Chapter Six-Home Rule and Expansion of the Race Line

Professor Kull observes that between 1873 and 1896 the courts and
legislative councils of various states did not embrace colorblindness.
Courts repeatedly found that the Fourteenth Amendment did not embody a
rule of nondiscrimination. 9 8 Additionally, states adopted laws requiring
separate but equal facilities or separate tax systems to fund schools for
Black and White children. 99 Moreover, this period inaugurated the most
KILL, supra note 6, at
KULL, supra note 6, at
95. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
96. Id. at 488.
97. Id.
98. KuuL, supra note 6, at
99. KuLL, supra note 6, at

93.
94.

69-82.
82.

88-89.
89.
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rigid racial segregation of our history. Virtually no area of public meeting
was free of a color line.' 00 Professor C. Vann Woodward wrote:
The phase that began in 1877 was inaugurated by the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, the abandonment of the Negro as a ward of
the nation, the giving up ofthe attempt to guarantee the freedman his
civil and political equality, and the acquiescence of the rest of the country
in the South's demand that the whole problem be left to the disposition of
the dominant Southern white people. What the new status of the Negro
would be was not at once apparent, nor were the Southern white people
themselves so united on that subject at first as has been generally assumed. The determination of the Negro's "place" took shape gradually
under the influence of economic and political conflicts among divided
white people--conflicts that were eventually resolved in part at the expense of the Negro. In the early years of the twentieth century, it was
becoming clear that the Negro would be effectively disfranchised
throughout the South, that he would be firmly relegated to the lower
rungs of the economic ladder, and that neither equality nor aspirations for
equality in any department of life were for him. 10 '
Woodward wrote that the Jim Crow laws enacted in the late nineteenth
century
constituted the most elaborate and formal expression of sovereign white
opinion upon the subject. In bulk and detail as well as in effectiveness of
enforcement the segregation codes were comparable with the black codes
of the old regime, though the laxity that mitigated the harshness of the
black codes was replaced by a rigidity that was more typical of the segregation code. That code lent the sanction of law to a racial ostracism that
extended to churches and schools, to housing and jobs, to eating and
drinking. Whether by law or by custom, that ostracism extended to virtually all forms of public transportation, to sports and recreations, to hospitals, orphanages, prisons, and
asylums, and ultimately to funeral homes,
2
morgues, and cemeteries.' 0
The racial separation was not limited to the South. In the North,
Woodward wrote:
[T]he Northern Negro was made painfully and constantly aware that he
lived in a society dedicated to the doctrine of white supremacy and Negro
inferiority. The major political parties, whatever their position on slavery, vied with each other in their devotion to this doctrine, and extremely
few politicians of importance dared question them. Their constituencies
firmly believed that the Negroes were incapable of being assimilated politically, socially, or physically into white society. They made sure in
numerous ways that the Negro understood his "place" and that he was
severely confined to it. One of these ways was segregation, and with the

100. See C. VANN
101. Id. at 6-7.
102. Id.at 7.

WOODWARD,

THE STRANGE

CAREER OF

JtM CROw (3d ed. 1974).
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backing of legal and extra-legal codes, the system permeated all aspects
of Negro life in the free states by 1860.103
State segregation codes were not color-blind. Race was the baseline for the
exclusion of Blacks from myriad accommodations and opportunities.
Kull aptly notes that the Supreme Court opinions during this same period provided no exception to the tradition of color awareness. The Court
consistently construed the Civil War Amendments narrowly so as not to
protect civil rights under federal authority. For example, in the SlaughterHouse Cases' °4 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to rights of national citizenship and did not encompass any of the fundamental rights of
the individual. Those rights, according to Justice Miller, related only to
state citizenship. For Justice Miller, rights of national citizenship included
the right to travel to the national seat of government, the right to sue in
federal courts and the right to protection on the high seas or abroad.10 5 The
Court has never overruled Slaughter-House. The decision mocks congressional efforts to nationalize protection of the basic civil rights of former
slaves.
Several other opinions of the Court following the rationale of Slaughter-House specifically undermined the Civil Rights Acts of 1870, 1871 and
1875. In United States v. Cruikshank'°6 the Court applied the theory of
Slaughter-House to an alleged violation of two Blacks' right to assemble.
The Court held that unless the purpose of the assembly had some connection to a person's relationship to the federal government, such as to petition
the government for redress of grievances, the Civil Rights Act of 1870 provided no relief.10 7 Therefore, the Court essentially held that the right to
assemble was not one of the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. What the Court had done three years earlier to the Fourteenth Amendment, it had now repeated with the civil rights statutes.
The Cruikshank opinion went further and held that the Fourteenth
Amendment gave the national government power only to see that states did
not deny their citizens equality of rights.108 The Court therefore further
restricted the Fourteenth Amendment to "state" action. The Court again set
out the state action doctrine three years later in Virginia v. Rives.' 0 9 By

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 18. See also LEON F. LrrWACK,
1790-1860 (1961).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Id. at 79.
92 U.S. 542 (1876).
Id. at 548-55.

108.
109.

Id. at 554-55.
100 U.S. 313 (1880), overruled by Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966).

103.
STATES,

NORTH OF SLAVERY:

THE NEGRO IN THE FREE
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reading a "state" action requirement into the civil rights statutes, the Court
made it virtually impossible to use the civil rights acts to prosecute private
individuals who most often violated the rights of former slaves. 110
The Supreme Court delivered its greatest blow to the civil rights laws
in the Civil Rights Cases.III There the Court invalidated the first two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which outlawed discrimination in
public accommodations.' 2 Again, extending the reasoning of SlaughterHouse, the Court determined that because the provisions were directed at
private individuals and not the state or its agents, the provisions were unconstitutional. Essentially, the Court found that private discrimination was
beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore also beyond
the scope of laws that were derived from the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court specifically concluded that the fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress power to correct the effects of state laws that violated
the first section of the amendment. 1 3 Justice John Harlan, presenting the
lone dissent, wrote, "I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and
spirit of the recent [Civil War] amendments of the Constitution have been
sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism."' " 4 The Court clearly
did not apply a colorblindness standard in deciding the Slaughter-House
Cases and their progeny.
H.

Chapter Seven-The Antithetical Relationship Between Separate
But Equal and Justice Harlan's Color-Blind
Constitutionalism

Professor Kull's review of Plessy v. Ferguson1 5 in the context of
Charles Sumner's work five decades earlier is insightful. Kull writes that
"[t]he true holding of Plessy is not 'separate but equal' but the Supreme
Court's refusal to deny to the state the option of treating citizens differently
according to race." ' 1 6 Kull contends that since 1896, the development of
the doctrine has followed the ebb and flow of the Court"s idea of what
constitutes reasonable discrimination.' '7 In addition, Kull suggests Plessy
embodies both our constitutional law of racial discrimination and the doc110. Id. at 318. See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (concluding that the
conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was void).
111. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
112. Id. at 9-27.
113. Id. at 20-26.
114. Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
116. KULL, supra note 6, at 118.
117.

KULL, supra note 6, at 118.
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trine of nondiscrimination as expressed by Harlan. 18 Kull also demonstrates that colorblindness was an alternative available to the Court in 1896
and that seven justices rejected its formulation. 1 9 Once again, what
emerges from Professor Kull's excellent research is not a tradition of constitutional colorblindness, but rather a tradition of its rejection.
Professor Kull, like many other commentators, quotes the most famous
lines of Justice Harlan's dissent:
But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here. Our constitution 120
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.

Kull asserts that Justice Harlan's dissent "added not only new rhetorical
force but also a new and complementary legal analysis that avoided the
familiar stalemate over 'separate but equal' by denying the authority of the
' 21
courts to police the reasonableness of legislative classifications."'
Justice Harlan did not simply declare that our constitution is colorblind. Rather, he wrote that in the eye of the law there is no superior class
or caste, and that our constitution does not tolerate classes among citizens.' 22 If Justice Harlan's central concern was the elimination of caste and
racial subordination, it is a significant stretch to interpret his dissenting
opinion to prohibit racial classifications designed to eliminate such caste.
Professor Kull places too little emphasis on the words surrounding the
clause "Our constitution is color-blind . . . ." To be sure, Justice Harlan
lived in a world in which the White race deemed itself to be the dominant
race; I believe this context informed his statements regarding nondiscrimination. 123 If Justice Harlan meant what he wrote, then he did not construe
118. KULL, supra note 6, at 118.
119. KuLL, supra note 6, at 118.
120. KULL, supra note 6, at 123 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559).
121. KULL, supra note 6, at 113.
122. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
123. Id. Justice Harlan was the first member of the Supreme Court to articulate the doctrine
of colorblindness. This is ironic, in part, because Harlan himself was a former slaveholder in
Kentucky who ultimately disavowed slavery. For biographical data on Justice Harlan, see generally LOREN P. BETH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JUSTICE (1992), and FRANK B.
LATHAM, THm GREAT DISSErTER: JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 1833-1911 (1970). To understand
what Justice Harlan meant in his dissent, it is instructive to note the text preceding his famous

quote. Before writing that "Our constitution is color-blind," Justice Harlan wrote:
The White race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here. Our constitution is color-blind ....
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
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the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit congressional efforts to end racial
caste.
I.

Chapter Eight-The Doctrine of Reasonable Racial
Classifications

Professor Kull effectively illustrates how the reasonable racial classification standard evolved from a judicially deferential standard in Plessy to
what we refer to as strict scrutiny in modem parlance.' 24 Thus, in 1917, a
unanimous Court held unconstitutional a Louisville ordinance that forbade
the occupancy by a person of one race, White or Black, of residential property located on a city block predominantly populated by persons of the
other race. 1 25 In 1938, the Court held unconstitutional a policy of excluding
Blacks from the law school at the University of Missouri. 26 Finally,
in 1943 Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone wrote, "Distinctions between citi-

zens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
27
equality."'
Kull suggests that this one sentence, for a time, put the authority of the
unanimous Court behind the colorblindness principle. 28 Yet, Chief Justice
Stone referred to the doctrine of equality-the malleable, standardless
doctrine that Kull argues should be replaced with a nondiscrimination policy. It seems that to Chief Justice Stone, the term "equality" meant nondiscrimination.1 29 Kull's reference to Chief Justice Stone undermines his
argument regarding a difference between the terms "equality" and

"nondiscrimination."

I interpret Justice Harlan's dissent to mean that the Constitution prohibited Whites from
using race as a basis for subordinating Blacks. Justice Harlan could not have meant that it was
unconstitutional for government to take race into account. He acknowledged that the Civil War
Amendments were in fact adopted to secure for the newly freed Blacks all the civil rights enjoyed
by Whites, and he had written 13 years earlier that:
If the constitutional amendments be enforced, according to the intent with which, as I
conceive, they were adopted, there cannot be, in this republic, any class of human beings in practicalsubjection to another class, with power in the latter to dole out to the
former just such privileges as they may choose to grant.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
124. KULL, supra note 6, at 131-37.
125. KULL, supra note 6, at 138-41 (citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917)).
126. KULL, supra note 6, at 141-43 (citing Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337,
352 (1938)).
127. KULL, supra note 6, at 144 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943)).
128. KuLL, supra note 6, at 144.
129. KULL, supra note 6, at 144-45.

Winter 1994]

ILLUSION OF A COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION

When Justice Hugo Black wrote that "legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect . . .[and
the] courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny,"1 30 he also made
clear that all racial classifications were not unconstitutional.1 31 Professor
Kull understands that "[tihere is, realistically, no constitutional guarantee

that is not subject to qualification if a majority of the Court conceives that
the country faces imminent peril."' 132 Furthermore, he suggests that if racial
classifications are permitted only during extreme emergencies, then the

Constitution may fairly be described as color-blind. 133 The problem here,
however, is Kull's failure to explain why a majority of the Court could or

should not think that racial caste (and its attendant national crises) is a national emergency that imperils the country. t 34 Kull says very little about
the social costs of racial caste in the United States. However, Professor
Andrew Hacker has recently suggested that the costs of such caste are
enormous.t35

J. Chapters Nine and Ten-Critiquing Brown and Its Progeny
Professor Kull examines the briefs of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
("LDF') lawyers and again identifies statements espousing colorblindness
policies.' 36 Kull joins many others who have criticized Chief Justice Earl
Warren for writing an opinion in Brown v. Board of Education137 that did
138
not explain its rationale and that was "historically and legally jejune."'
130. KULL, supra note 6, at 145 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944)).
131. KULL, supra note 6, at 145.
132. KULL, supra note 6, at 144.
133. KULL, supra note 6, at 144.
134. Professor Andrew Hacker has recently written very persuasively about racial caste in the
United States. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992). Professor Hacker wrote, "Dividing people into races started as convenient categories. However, those divisions have taken on lives of their own, dominating our culture and
consciousness, coloring our passions and opinions, contouring facts and fantasies." Id. at ix.
Hacker presents by stark statistical references the reality of racial differences between Blacks and
Whites in terms of education, income, crime and mortality. Id. at 17-49, 93-106, 134-46, 179-98.
See also GUmNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (20th anniversary ed., Harper & Row 1962) (discussing how the Negro problem is
intertwined with all other social, economic, political and cultural problems in America and the
author's optimism about future race relations in America); A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND
AMERICAN Socmry (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds., 1989) (discussing the
unfinished agenda of a nation still struggling to come to terms with the consequences of its history
of relations between Blacks and Whites).
135. HACKER, supra note 134, at 17-49, 93-106, 134-46, 179-98 (detailing the impact of caste
in education, income, crime and mortality).
136. KU., supra note 6, at 151-63.
137. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
138. KULL,supra note 6, at 152-55.
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Kull finds Brown unsatisfying because the Court did not disavow the constitutionality of segregation itself and because the opinion turned on social
science research. 139 Moreover, Kull says, social science research can
change, as suggested by the recent advocacy of all-Black-male immersion
schools in places like Milwaukee. 4° Kull writes that Brown was followed
by a series of memorandum decisions in which the Court held segregation
in all other public contexts invalid, but that the Court never explained its
1 41
rationale in terms of constitutional doctrine.
My critique of Brown is quite different. Chief Justice Warren did
explain in constitutional terms why segregation in public schools violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's equality principle. He wrote: "To separate
[Black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone." 1 42 The Brown opinion means that the state cannot remain true
to the Fourteenth Amendment and legislate in ways that generate feelings of
inferiority regarding a group's status in the society. Brown establishes a
rule of anti-subordination.
In these two chapters, the reader receives the best view of Professor
Kull's rationale for writing the book. Why write a story about the history of
the idea of constitutional colorblindness? Because, Professor Kull believes,
civil rights activists took a wrong turn, a turn away from the achievement of
racial equality. Professor Kull writes, "For a brief period in the early
1960s, some members of the Supreme Court appeared to regard the colorblindness of the Constitution as a settled thing."' 143 He cites Anderson v.
Martin'" as additional proof that the leading civil rights strategists of the
day thought it was unconstitutional for Louisiana to require that nomination
and ballot papers specify the race of candidates for office.' 45 They argued,
as Justice Harlan had eighty years earlier, that "[o]ur constitution is colorblind."1 46 Yet, the evidence Kull adduces suggests that James M. Nabrit III
and Jack Greenberg, among others, did not embrace a literal colorblindness.
Indeed, they understood that some racial classifications might occasionally
serve some useful purpose.' 47 Interestingly, Kull agrees that it would be
139.
140.
141.
142.

KULL, supra note 6, at 154.
KULL, supra note 6,at 154 n.13.
KULL, supra note 6, at 161-62.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).

143. KULL, supra note 6, at
144. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
145. KULL, supra note 6, at
146. KULL, supra note 6, at
147. KULL, supra note 6, at

164.
166.
166.
166.
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difficult to contend for a literalapplication of a colorblindness rule without
minimum qualifications; otherwise, the colorblindness idea might become
an absurdity.148 This argument strengthens the policy of the Supreme Court
to permit reasonable racial classifications and undermines Kull's vociferous
critique of that policy.
Kull's research makes quite plain that by 1964, lawyers and jurists
battling segregation and race discrimination in voting understood that a
strict colorblindness was impractical and an obstacle to eliminating racial
caste.149 Thus, Judge John Minor Wisdom wrote:
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid conflict with the equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit,
causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be based on race. In that
sense, the Constitution is color blind. But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the effects
is the relevancy of color to a legitiof past discrimination. The criterion
150
mate governmental purpose.
For Professor Kull, Judge Wisdom's words mark the "moment at which the
color-blind ideal was jettisoned by its former proponents."' 5 1 Its abandonment was rationalized on the theory "that race-conscious measures might
properly be employed 'to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to
undo the effects of past discrimination. ' 1 52 Professor Kull writes that
Judge Wisdom banished colorblindness from contemporary constitutional
53
law.'
Professor Kull asserts that the dramatic struggle to overturn legal inequality in the late 1950s and early 1960s had absorbed everyone's atten154
tion, so that only with victory was it apparent how little would change.
Professor Kull writes, "The problem was that residents of Harlem and
Watts already enjoyed equality before the law."' 55 Kull suggests that civil
rights advocates sought only formal "legal" equality rather than substantive
equality, and they discovered too late that formal equality "was equality in
1 56
inadequate measure.
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KULL, supra note 6, at 181 (citing United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372

F.2d 836, 837 (5th Cir. 1966)).
151. KULL, supra note 6, at 181.
152. KULL, supra note 6, at 181 (citing Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d at 876).
153. KULL, supra note 6, at 181. I think nondiscrimination/colorblindness language still appears in decisions of the Supreme Court, but the meaning of the terms is not the literal meaning
suggested by Kull. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 477-86 (1989); Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 562-85 (1990); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993).
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The implication is that civil rights strategists, including the late
Supreme. Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, were not clever enough to see
that little would change by their efforts. This is offensive and misguided
because it assumes that civil rights advocates throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries were not interested in reversing the racial caste of
Blacks. 157 Moreover, it misses the point of the Civil War Amendments and
successive civil rights struggles.' 5 8 Professor Kull does not in fact prove
that the attack on segregation between 1830 and 1965 was anything short of
a struggle to ameliorate racial caste.
K.

Chapter Eleven-Is Colorblindness a Solution for Eliminating
Racial Caste?

Professor Kull's last chapter is the most intriguing and the most troubling. It begins with the celebration of the enactment of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 159 Kull says each embraced a
rule of nondiscrimination for all individuals, Black and White. 16° However,
he concludes his book by writing the following:
No one will contend, however, that a strict legal equality can of itself
settle the score between the United States of America and the descendants of her slaves. Where race-specific measures direct benefits to persons whose ancestors were brought to this country in slavery, the sense
that this discrimination works rough justice-unjust,
but less unjust than
161
doing nothing-cannot easily be dismissed.
No other racial or ethnic group among America's immigrants has a
comparable claim to special treatment, and the moral awkwardness of
asking black Americans to be content with nondiscrimination
should not
1 62
stop us from giving that answer to everyone else.
.Here, Kull seems to say that racial preferences for Blacks are morally
defensible. If that is the point of his book, then I agree. Simply put, racial
classifications designed to eliminate racial caste or subordination ought to
be permissible under a constitution that neither knows nor tolerates caste.
If Professor Kull is saying that the racial caste of Blacks can be addressed
157. Biographers are only beginning to assess the tremendous legal accomplishments of the
late Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall. See generally CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS,
DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF THURGOOD MARSHALL (1993); MICHAEL D. DAVIS &
HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH (1992);
ROGER GOLDMAN WITH DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL (1992). When

the record is more complete, I believe Marshall will stand as one of the most significant legal
minds of the twentieth century.
158. See Fair, supra note 18, at 25-31.
159. KULL, supra note 6, at 182.
160. KuLL, supra note 6, at 182.
161. KULL, supra note 6, at 222-23.
162. KULL, supra note 6, at 223.
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with special preferences, he could have made that point more directly at the
outset. If, instead, he is arguing that programs that favor formerly disfavored racial groups are as equally unjust as the kinds of segregation and
discrimination against Blacks that he alludes to throughout the book, I
strongly disagree.
Professor Kull's final chapter is an indictment against what he calls
"benign racial sorting."1 6 3 In this category he includes compensatory racial
preferences relating to racial balance in public schools, economic affirmative action and voting rights policies designed to increase proportionately
minority officeholding.l 64 Professor Kull writes:
Part of the future argument for the color-blind Constitution will thus be
that the Supreme Court, alone among American institutions, retains the
power to deflect what will otherwise become an irreversible tendency
toward the convenient and destructive practice of allocating social resources by racial and ethnic groups. Whether the Court in fact has that
power will not be seen unless and until it makes the attempt. The likelihood that a future Supreme Court will attempt to reinstate a constitutional rule of color blindness depends, obviously enough, on the view of
political and social developments taken by the members of the Court over
the next generation. As a minimum precondition to any announcement
that the Constitution is color-blind, a majority of the Supreme Court
would have to be persuaded that the racial preferences associated with
school desegregation, affirmative action, and voting rights are not indispensable to the nation's discharge of its obligations to black citizens;
and
165
that such policies carry social costs that outweigh their benefits.
Here, Professor Kull indicates many of his views regarding affirmative
action. He thinks it is destructive to allocate social resources by racial and
ethnic groups and that affirmative action policies carry social costs that outweigh their benefits. I think the social costs to our society are far greater to
continue the illusion of colorblindness. Under that doctrine, racial caste
will persist for most Blacks. Racial caste is the product of several centuries
of discrimination against Blacks. It is now systemic and appears normative.
The only way to eliminate it is to take account of race-to recognize the
reality of race-based caste.
Moreover, Kull is incorrect to suggest the Court may reinstate a rule of
colorblindness since his book seems to suggests that we have not had a
tradition of colorblindness. The colorblindness standard preserves the historical advantages Whites have enjoyed over Blacks. For me, this makes
the doctrine unfair and unsound.
163.
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III. Conclusion
Professor Kull has written an important book. He identifies colorblindness rhetoric much earlier than 1896. However, he does not establish
a 125-year constitutional colorblindness tradition in American constitutional law. Instead, he demonstrates repeatedly how colorblindness was rejected at almost every turn by a majority of the Supreme Court and by state
and federal legislative bodies.
The current Supreme Court does not follow Kull or the middle ground
that I describe more fully in my colorblindness essay.1 66 Instead, the Court
adheres to its case-by-case judicial assessment of the reasonableness of racial classifications as set forth in Shaw v. Reno. Professor Kull probably
believes Shaw was decided correctly, but under the wrong analysis. I believe Shaw was wrongly decided. The racial classification presented by the
North Carolina reapportionment plan was designed to eliminate the racial
caste and subordination of Blacks in political representation; the creation of
the second majority-minority district did not place others in a caste-like,
subordinate position.
While I hope Professor Kull's book will have broad readership and
stimulate discussion, I do not think colorblindness is an answer to the contemporary crisis of racial caste. When the colorblindness doctrine is used to
prohibit affirmative action as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the
Fourteenth Amendment is turned against the very group it was designed to
protect. 167
Justice Blackmun expressed it best when he wrote:
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be
so is to demand the impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must
first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat
some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot-we8
dare not-let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.16

166. See Fair, supra note 18, at 73-81.
167. As long ago as 1873 the Court wrote that the main purpose of the Civil War Amendments was to protect former slaves from continuing abuses against them. See Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 37-38 (1873). We should give our Constitution an interpretation
that not just permits, but rather affirmatively requires government to eliminate the continuing
effects of racial discrimination.
168. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., separate
opinion).

